
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WEEKLY SUMMARY

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24 July 1970 No. 0380/70 81-228541// The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the contents pages.

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
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Communist China - USSR

The absence from Peking of the chief Soviet negotiator, Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, has not disrupted the deadlocked Sino-Soviet border negotiations. Soviet Foreign Ministry officials privately informed foreign diplomats last week that since Kuznetsov returned to Moscow on 30 June the talks have been continuing on a business-as-usual basis under the supervision of his deputy, General Gankovsky. Kuznetsov reportedly is recovering from the illness that forced his departure, but one Soviet diplomat hinted last week that the envoy would not be returning to the talks.

Neither Soviet nor Chinese officials have commented on recent Western press reports from Moscow which claim that Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev has been designated as Kuznetsov's replacement in the Peking talks. Ilichev, who was Khrushchev's chief propagandist and who was closely associated with the anti-Chinese polemics of the early 1960s, has been in partial disfavor since Khrushchev's ouster. Although the Chinese would probably take a somewhat jaundiced view of Ilichev's nomination, his appointment would satisfy their desire to have the talks continue at the deputy foreign minister level. At the same time, it would serve Soviet interests by allowing Moscow to assign Kuznetsov to productive work elsewhere.

Soviet officials, meanwhile, have informed the US that the widely rumored exchange of ambassadors between Moscow and Peking will take place "soon." Other diplomats in Moscow report that the Chinese, after a three-month delay, have finally approved Moscow's choice, reported to be a former high-ranking propaganda official, Vladimir Stepakov. Western diplomats in Peking also add that China has in fact reciprocated by nominating Liu Hsin-chuan, a Foreign Ministry official who had been in trouble during the Cultural Revolution, as ambassador to Moscow.

Given Peking's stony silence on the issue and the Soviets' penchant in the past for making overly optimistic—and self-serving—noises about an ambassadorial exchange, it is difficult to assess the validity of the latest rumors. Late last year, Peking reportedly agreed "in principle" to exchange ambassadors, but since then it has consistently refused to grant agrement to Moscow's nominee. The Chinese have feared that Moscow has been irritated over the lack of progress at the border discussions and would exploit the appointment in order to downgrade the negotiations to the ambassadorial level and to bring Kuznetsov home. If the reports, that Moscow now intends to replace Kuznetsov with a similarly high-ranking envoy, turn out to be true, however, China's suspicions over an ambassadorial exchange might be substantially reduced.

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